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ACCOUNTANTS' THIRD PARTY LIABILITY-
HOW FAR DO WE GO?
CONSTANTINE N. KATSORIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
M ODERN technology has produced an unprecedented record of growth
and development in this country since the turn of the century. Prog-
ress, however, has brought with it a maze of rules, regulations and other
complications inherent in keeping order within such a mammoth society.
Ideally suited and trained to solve the myriad financial headaches spawned
by such an atmosphere is the accountant.
The financial services rendered by the accounting profession to the
business community consist not only of auditing and financial reporting
but also of tax practice and management consulting. The primary function
of the profession, however, still remains the examination of the financial
statements of clients and the expression of an expert opinion-in the form
of a report-on the fairness with which they present financial positions and
results of operations.' It is on these reports that the entire business com-
munity relies in conducting its affairs. Because of the great reliance placed
on such reports, impartiality of authorship is often a requisite; accord-
ingly, the principal burden of preparing or certifying such reports rests
largely with the independent public accountant.
Inaccuracies in computing financial worth or profitability of operations
can cause immeasurable loss to those who rely upon such reports. To
recoup resultant losses, the aggrieved party often seeks redress from the
person benefited, and lately, with greater frequency, has in addition
sought to impose liability on the calculator of the figures, the accountant.
Presently, there are approximately 100 such suits (involving many mil-
lions of dollars) pending against CPA firms alone. These suits have been
instituted by disgruntled "investors and creditors who contend that the
auditors failed to perform their watchdog function properly and, as a
result, cost them (the plaintiffs) money."2
Various reasons have been suggested in an attempt to explain this rash
of suits:
(1) the hope of banks and other financial institutions to make accounting firms a
source of salvage when credit losses occur; (2) the general growth of the American
economy and the related increase in loss potential in the event of a business failure;
and (3) the publicity accompanying the six-million dollar lawsuit against Peat, Mar-
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; member of the New
York and Federal Bars.
1. See S. Levy, Accountants' Legal Responsibility 6 (1954).
2. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, at 13, col. 2.
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wick, Mitchell & Co., the nation's largest public accounting firm, brought by the two
largest banks in the United States, the Bank of America and the Chase Manhattan
Bank.3
Regardless of the reasons, however, the plain fact remains that the cost
of liability coverage sold to accounting firms has risen by as much as 30
per cent and more.4 Moreover, many of the insurers who wrote such
coverage relatively freely in the past now handle it only as an accommoda-
tion for big accounts or in a limited manner.5
Although liability can also arise out of the accountant's improper per-
formance in rendering tax and management consulting services,0 this
article will concern itself only with the liability arising from improper
auditing and financial reporting. Such liability inures in favor of not only
the client on whose behalf the services are rendered but, in many in-
stances, third parties.
The accountant's relationship with the client arises out of a contract,
though his undertakings may differ greatly from retainer to retainer. 7
While the retainer may set forth only the duties to be performed, in-
corporated into every such contract of his employment (whether expressed
or implied) "is the duty to perform the accounting services bargained for
with the skill to be expected of a reasonably prudent man with this train-
ing and knowledge."" Should the accountant's conduct fall below these
professional standards "he may be held liable to his client for breach of
contract, or in tort for breach of the general duty to exercise due care,
arising out of the contract relationship."'
Auditors' liability to third parties, however, not only is permeated with
greater uncertainties, but also presents an area of far greater potential
liability to the accountant than arises from the accountant-client relation-
ship. Accordingly, the balance of this article will be devoted to a dis-
cussion of the extent of such liability.
3. Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for Negligence, 41 St. John's
L. Rev. 588, 597 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
4. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
5. Id. at 13, col. 4.
6. See Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 324, 344 (1957).
7. Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 Vand. L. Rev.
797, 798 (1959).
8. Note, The Accountant's Liability-For What and to Whom, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 319, 320
(1951) (footnote omitted). See also Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d
364 (1955), which compares the standards of reasonable care applicable to accountants with
those applied to lawyers, doctors, architects, engineers and other professional men engaged
in furnishing skilled services for compensation, and concludes they are the same.
9. Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liability for Defective Financial Reports, 15 Hastings
L.J. 436, 437-38 (1964) (footnote omitted).
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II. AuDiTORs' LiA.BILITY To TH-rD PARTiES
Although the general topic of auditors' liability to third persons has
been ably considered,"0 such liability to third persons is hardly in total
resolve." Unlike the relationship existing between the accountant and his
client, there is generally no contractual obligation between the accountant
and a third person to perform promised services with due care. Accord-
ingly, liability at common law against the accountant has been sought
primarily by the aggrieved third party for varying degrees of negligence
and deceit. While the common law has generally defined and limited the
accountant's responsibility for negligence, it has decidedly emphasized his
exposure to third persons on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or
deceit.' 2 As the rules developed, however, the law of negligent misrepre-
sentation and the law of fraud often became inextricably entangled. M1ore-
over, the development of the common law influenced the enactment of
federal legislation "which has broadened the responsibility for negligence
where the claims of investors or securities purchasers are involved.""
There also exists some state legislation imposing varying degrees of third
party liability upon the accountant, but this article will explore these
statutes only as they are incidentally reflected in reported cases.
A. Liability Based Upon Negligence
Initially, clinging to ancient historical concepts, the common law recog-
nized no liability for negligence, except as between parties in privity.1
4
Under this doctrine, a plaintiff could not maintain an action in tort for
harm caused by a defendant's negligent performance of a contract, unless
the plaintiff was in privity of contract with the defendant."
With respect to negligent acts causing physical injury to persons, this
10. See generally Bradley, Auditor's Liability and the Need for Increased Accounting
Uniformity, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 898 (1965); Hawkins, Professional Negligence
Liability of Public Accountants, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 797 (1959); Levitin, Accountants' Scope
of Liability for Defective Financial Reports, 15 Hastings L.J. 436 (1964); Mac-Millan, Sources
and Extent of Liability of a Public Accountant, 15 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1 (1936); 'Meek,
Liability of the Accountant to Parties Other Than -His Employer for Negligent Misrepresenta-
tion, 1942 Wis. L. Rev. 371; Rouse, Legal Liability of the Public Accountant, 23 Ky. L.J. 3
(1934); Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.-Negligent Misrepresentation by Ac-
countants, 67 Law Q. Rev. 466 (1951); 31 Colum. L. Rev. 858 (1931); 16 Cornell L.Q.
419 (1931); 33 Ill. L. Rev. 349 (1938); 26 M11. L. Rev. 49 (1931); 29 Mich. L. Rev. 648
(1931); 3 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 11 (1947); 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 436 (1939); 6 Rutgers
L. Rev. 478 (1952); 13 St. John's L. Rev. 310 (1939); 6 U. Chi. L. Rev. 127 (1938).
11. The Specter of Auditors' Liability, J. Accountancy, Sept. 1965, at 33 (Editorial).
12. S. Levy, supra note 1, at 29.
13. Id.
14. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
15. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
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strict requirement of privity was gradually weakened toward the latter
part of the nineteenth century by such cases as Heaven v. Pender.'0 In
Heaven, the defendant, a dockowner, contracted with a shipowner for the
placing of a staging on defendant's dock outside the latter's ship. Plaintiff,
while in the employ of a ship painter who had contracted with the ship-
owner to paint the outside of the ship, was injured when the staging
collapsed as he climbed on it to paint the ship. Despite lack of privity, the
dockowner was held liable for the injuries sustained by the painter.
The first assaults on this "citadel of privity" in the United States were
made by negligence cases involving articles that were inherently dan-
gerous and were likely to "put human life in imminent danger." 7 These
were followed by MacPherson v. Buick,'" which held that "[i] f the nature
of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril
when negligently made . . . . [and] there is added knowledge that the
thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser ... without new
tests . . ."" then liability for negligent manufacture will not be limited
to parties in contract privity. These cases, however, generally involved
negligence resulting in tangible physical harm to person or property, and
not mere loss to intangible economic interests.2' The extension to intangi-
ble economic interests was soon made by Glanzer v. Shepard.
21
In Glanzer, the defendant was a public weigher who, at the vendor's
request, supplied the vendee with a certificate stating the determined
weight of a shipment of beans. The buyer paid an excessive purchase price
because of his reliance on the defendant's certificate, which contained a
negligent overstatement of the weight. The court imposed liability on the
defendant for the pecuniary loss of the buyer, on the ground that the
plaintiff's use of the certificate was not an incidental consequence, but was
the sole purpose of the weighing. The court felt that since the defendant
intended the plaintiff to rely on the certificate, the defendant's duty of
care was not limited to the other party to the contract but exended to the
plaintiff as well.22
In 1931, however, Ultramares Corp. v. Touche23 came before the New
16. 11 Q.B.D. 503 (CA. 1883).
17. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 409 (1852). In this case the defendant, who was
a dealer in medicines, sold a druggist poison which he had negligently labelled as extract of
dandelion. The druggist, in good faith, used the poison so mislabelled in filling a prescription.
The court held the original vendor liable for the injuries suffered by the patient.
18. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
19. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
20. Levitin, supra note 10, at 440.
21. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
22. Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275-76.
23. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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York Court of Appeals. The defendants, independent auditors, were hired
by Fred Stem & Co., Inc. ("Stern") to prepare and certify a balance
sheet exhibiting Stern's condition as of December 31, 1923. From prior
dealings, defendants knew that Stern used such statements in obtaining
the extensive credit required to finance its operations. Accordingly, when
the defendants prepared the balance sheet, they supplied Stern with
thirty-two certified copies thereof.
The balance sheet, as certified, showed assets of $2,550,671.88, liabil-
ities of $1,479,956.62 and a net worth of $1,070, 715.26. In reality, Stem
was insolvent on the balance sheet date. Plaintiff loaned money to Stern in
reliance upon the balance sheet. When Stern was declared a bankrupt
soon thereafter, plaintiff sued the accountants in common law fraud and
negligence. The trial court dismissed the fraud action, but submitted the
question of negligence to the jury. After the jury returned a substantial
plaintiff's verdict on the negligence count, it was set aside by the trial
court. The appellate division affirmed the dismissal of the fraud action,
but reinstated the negligence verdict..2 ' The court of appeals reversed the
reinstatement of the negligence verdict, but ordered a new trial in con-
nection with the fraud count.
Although the evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury's
negligence verdict, the court of appeals, in refusing to recognize such
liability, stated:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect
a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to
a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle
doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences.2 5
In rejecting such liability for negligence, however, the court was careful
not to overrule Glanzer, distinguishing it as follows:
In a word, the service rendered by the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was pri-
marily for the information of a third person, in effect, if not in name, a party to the
contract, and only incidentally for that of the formal promisee. In the case at hand,
the service was primarily for the benefit of the Stern Company, a convenient instru-
mentality for use in the development of the business, and only incidentally or col-
laterally for the use of those to whom Stem and his associates might exhibit it
thereafter.26
The validity of this distinction between Ultramares and Glanzer, which
has been challenged by numerous authorities, 7 is questionable, partic-
24. 229 App. Div. 581, 243 N.Y.S. 179 (Ist Dep't 1930).
25. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
26. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
27. See Levitin, supra note 10, at 445; Meek, Liability of the Accountant to Parties Other
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ularly since the court in Glanzer specifically stated: "We do not need to
state the duty in terms of contract or of privity. Growing out of a con-
tract, it has none the less an origin not exclusively contractual. Given the
contract and the relation, the duty is imposed by law."",
The distinction generally drawn between Glanzer and Ultramares is
that the identity of the persons likely to rely on the defendants' certified
balance sheet was unknown in Ultramares, while reliance was known to
be limited to one identified party in Glanzer.29 Unlike Glanzer, therefore,
Ultramares involved the danger of limitless liability, a burden the court
did not wish to impose upon the accounting profession." In spite of some
criticism of Ultramares, it is principally for this public policy reason3l that
the weight of authority in this country still supports the general proposi-
tion that an accountant is not liable to third parties for mere negligence.
32
This trend has been justified on the ground that most suits of this kind
are now framed in terms of fraud,33 where the scope of liability to third
persons is broader than in negligence.34 However, the law is still largely uin-
settled on the question of what conduct on the part of the accountant will
be held to be fraud, gross negligence or mere negligence.3 Furthermore,
since the three are often conceptually intertwined, the law regarding the
duty owed by accountants to third persons becomes even more confused.3
In England, the development of the law in this area has been different.
In Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.,37 the accountants, ,during the
course of preparing a balance sheet for the client, were told by him to
exhibit it to a prospective investor when completed. The accountants
Than His Employer for Negligent Misrepresentation, 1942 Wis. L. Rev. 371, 383-88; Note,
The Accountant's Liability-for What and to Whom, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 319, 320-21 (1951);
Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for Negligence, 41 St. John's L.
Rev. 588, 592 (1967).
28. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922).
29. See Note, The Accountant's Liability-for What and to Whom, 36 Iowa L. Rev.
319, 326 (1951).
30. Id.
31. See Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for Negligence, 41 St.
John's L. Rev. 588, 593 (1967).
32. Hawkins, supra note 7, at 815-16.
33. Id.
34. S. Levy, supra note 1.
35. Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 324, 327 (1957).
36. See Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mene.,
285 App. Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 1955); Bradley, Liability to Third
Persons for Negligent Audit, 1966 J. Bus. L. 190; Bradley, Auditor's Liability and the
Need for Increased Accounting Uniformity, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 898, 916 (1965);
Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 372, 394-404 (1939).
37. [1951] 2 K.B. 164.
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complied, and in reliance on the balance sheet, the investor purchased an
interest in the company. After the company became insolvent, it appeared
that the accountants were extremely careless in the preparation of the
balance sheet. In holding for the defendants, the court, in a 2-to-1 decision,
citing Ultramares, ruled that accountants are not liable for negligent
misrepresentation to third persons. It has been properly pointed out, how-
ever, that the analogy to Ultramares was poorly drawn, and that if Ameri-
can authority was to be used, it should have been Glanzer.
An interesting question arises: would Ultramares impose liability on
the accountants under the facts present in Candler? In Glanzer, the public
weigher was held liable to a third person for negligent weight. Ultramares
distinguished Glanzer, without reversing it. Accordingly, it is possible that
liability for mere negligence could be found if the particular third party,
or a limited group of which he was a member, was known to the accoun-
tants with sufficient definiteness as the party for whose primary benefit the
certified statement was intended. 9 A prudent creditor, therefore, who
wishes to rely on a certified financial statement of a debtor, should request
that it be furnished to him directly by the accountant, and that the ac-
countant be informed of its intended use. The accountant, in such a situa-
tion, might consider disclaiming liability, outlining the limits of his audit
or otherwise qualifying his statement. Whether such defensive measures
by the accountant are possible as a practical matter depends upon the ex-
tent to which he wishes to strain his relationship with the clientA
In a critical dissenting opinion in Candler, Lord Denning concluded that
the accountant's duty should extend to cases "where the accountant pre-
pares his accounts and makes his report for the guidance of the very per-
son in the very transaction in question."'" Otherwise, he felt, the auditor's
opinion "which should be a safeguard, becomes a snare for those who rely
on it."4  Over a decade later, Candler was also criticized by the House of
Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners,4 3 which involved
negligent credit references given by a debtor's banker (defendant) to the
plaintiff creditor. Although the court decided in favor of the defendant,
primarily on the basis of the defendant's express disclaimer of liability,
the Hedley decision has been interpreted to apply to accountants:
38. Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.-Negligent Misrepresentation by Accoun-
tants, 67 Law Q. Rev. 466, 478 (1951).
39. See S. Levy, supra note 1, at 43. See also Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, note 75
infra, and accompanying text.
40. See Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for Negligence, 41 St.
John's L. Rev. 588, 599-600 (1967).
41. [19511 2 K.B. 164, 183.
42. Id. at 185.
43. [1964] A.C. 465.
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But accountants may now be held in law to owe a duty of care to persons other
than those with whom they are in a contractual or fiduciary relationship and may be
liable for neglect of that duty if, but only if, they know or ought to know that a
financial report, account or statement prepared by them has been prepared for a
specific purpose or transaction, will be shown to a particular person or class of persons,
and may be relied on by that person or class of persons in that particular connection. 44
This reference to a foreseeable class bears a close resemblance to section
552 of the Restatement of Torts.4 5 Since the breadth of section 552, how-
ever, is admittedly unsupported by the weight of the cases, 40 revision
thereof is contemplated. The proposed new section 552, as it appears in
Tentative Draft Number 12 of the Restatement of Torts, Second, "has
narrowed the range of liability for negligent misrepresentation, abandon-
ing the 'foreseeable class of persons' test of the old Restatement. ... ,47 In
effect, the proposed revision limits liability to, inter alia, those for whose
benefit and guidance the accountant intended to supply the information, or
knows the recipient so intends to supply it.4" The Reporter's notes to this
section, however, admit some dissatisfaction with the section and express
hope that it can be improved. The notes also query
whether there is any limitation in terms of the size of the group to whom the
defendant knows that the recipient intends to communicate the information. What if
44. Accountant's Liability to Third Parties-the Hedley Byrne Decision, J. Accountancy,
Oct. 1965, at 66-67 (emphasis added).
45. Section 552 provides:
INFORMATION NEGLIGENTLY SUPPLIED FOR THE GUIDANCE OF OTHERS.
One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the guidance
of others in their business transactions is subject to liability for harm caused to them by their
reliance upon the information if
(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and communicating the
information which its recipient is justified in expecting, and
(b) the harm is suffered
(i) by the person or one of the class of persons for whose guidance the information
was supplied, and
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a transaction in which it was intended
to influence his conduct or in a transaction substantially identical therewith.
46. Restatement (Second) of Torts, Explanatory Notes § 552, at 54 (Tent. Draft No.
11, 1965).
47. Bradley, supra note 36, at 192.
48. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966) provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in a transaction
in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in
their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their
justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence
in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) Is limited to
loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to
supply the information, or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends the information to
influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to loss
suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the
transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
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an art expert certifies a painting as a genuine Vermeer, knowing that the dealer to
whom he gives the certificate intends to publish it in a bulletin to be sent to 1,000
prospective purchasers in the hope of making the sale? Is he liable for negligence to
the man who buys? The Reporter would say yes.40
Such a conclusion, however, is hardly alarming. Whether the painting
were exhibited to 1,000 or 1,000,000 prospective purchasers, only the
ultimate purchaser should have cause to complain.
Of greater concern, however, is whether the proposed Restatement and
other similar authorities include the situation where the merger of two
multi-stockholdered corporations of some substance is planned and the
accountant is asked to prepare and/or certify the basic financials of one
of the parties which will determine the merger value of that party. Will a
merely negligent overstatement of the financial condition of the audited
company in such a situation subject the accountant to liability to the
entire group of stockholders of the other corporation? It has been
suggested that the exculpatory rule of Ultramares might not apply to
such a situation because the auditor "is apprised of the merger, and the
use of the statement is not merely an incidental or collateral use of the
financial statements audited in regular course by an auditor who does not
know of any specific intended use."5 Another hypothetical question can
be raised: suppose, instead of the anticipated multi-purpose use of the
balance sheet in Ultramnares, a balance sheet-with the specific knowl-
edge of the auditors-were exhibited by the client solely for the purpose
of obtaining an open line of credit of indeterminate size from a specific
bank or group of banks. Would this make a negligent auditor potentially
liable to each member of this group in an indeterminate amount merely
because he knew the specific purpose and the person or class of persons
who would rely on his certification?
If Ultramares is to continue to be controlling on such questions, it is
submitted that the court in that case was not solely interested in nar-
rowing the scope of liability to those for whose primary benefit the report
was issued, but, more importantly, was concerned with the public policy
of protecting the accounting profession from a potentially ruinous liability.
Whether this protective policy should continue to prevail has been
questioned.5 Indeed, it has been suggested that "in the light of the eco-
nomic maturity of the independent accounting profession, further depen-
dence on judicial tenderness seems ill-founded.15 2
49. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552, at 16 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
50. Bradley, supra note 36, at 194.
51. See Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for Negligence, 41 St.
John's L. Rev. 588, 600-01 (1967).
52. Bradley, supra note 36, at 195.
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B. Liability Based Upon Deceit
Just as the accountant owes a duty of honesty to his client, so, it has
been repeatedly held, does he owe such a duty to certain third persons,
even in the absence of privity. In the leading English case on deceit,
Derry v. Peek,53 the defendants were directors of a tramway corporation.
In this capacity, they issued a prospectus to induce the public to subscribe
for stock in the corporation. Although the prospectus erroneously stated
that the company had the right to use steam or mechanical motive power
instead of horses, the trial court found as a fact that the defendants
honestly believed the truth of their statement. In holding such honest
belief a complete defense to an action in deceit, the House of Lords stated
that fraud, a necessary element of a cause of action in deceit, is proved
when
a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its
truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Although I have treated
the second and third as distinct cases, I think the third is but an instance of the
second, for one who makes a statement under such circumstances can have no real
belief in the truth of what he states. 54
The element of scienter, therefore, which is essential to the action of
deceit, can be established not only by proof of actual knowledge of the
falsity of a representation, but also by proving that there was a conscious
lack of knowledge of its truth or falsity, or by establishing recklessness
equivalent to a lack of genuine belief in the truth of the statement made."
Nor is it essential that the statement be false under every conceivable
inference. To constitute deceit, it is sufficient that the statement admits of
more than one interpretation and that the maker knew that it would prob-
ably be understood in its false sense.5" Moreover, the court in Derry was
careful to point out that although negligence per se is not a substitute for
deceit, it may nevertheless be evidence that the defendant did not have an
honest belief in the truth of his assertion.57
Derry has purportedly been followed in the majority of American juris-
dictions,58 and specific application of it to the accounting profession can
53. [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337.
54. Id. at 374.
55. Note, The Accountant's Liability-for What and to Whom, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 319,
321-22 (1951).
56. Meek, Liability of the Accountant to Parties Other Than His Employer for Negligent
Misrepresentation, 1942 Wis. L. Rev. 371, 372.
57. 14 App. Cas. at 375-76.
58. See W. Prosser, Torts § 102 (3d ed. 1964), which states, however, that if "one looks
to the facts of the cases rather than the formulae adopted by the courts, it is by no means
clear that Derry v. Peek is supported by the weight of American authority." Id. § 102, at 714.
For some of the American jurisdictions which have modified the Derry rule and extended the
action of deceit to (1) negligent misrepresentations and/or (2) innocent misrepresentations,
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be found in Ultramares.9 In considering the validity of the cause of
action for fraud, the court in Ultramares analyzed the accountants' two
sentence certificate, which read:
We have examined the accounts of Fred Stem & Co., Inc., for the year ending
December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed balance sheet is in accordance
therewith and with the information and explanations given us. We further certify
that, subject to provision for federal taxes on income, the said statement, in our
opinion, presents a true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stem &
Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923.60
It concluded that the first sentence of the certificate involved a repre-
sentation of fact, and the second, an expression of an opinion. Thus, it
found that the accountants "certified as a fact, true to their own knowl-
edge, that the balance sheet was in accordance with the books of ac-
count."'" As to this representation, the court stated that if "their state-
ment was false, they are not to be exonerated because they believed it to
be true."62 Whether the court intended this doctrine to be dispositive of
the fraud allegations is not quite clear." Indeed, it has been suggested
that:
This language should not be interpreted to mean that when the defendants certified
the balance sheet as true to their own knowledge they warranted its truth. It simply
means that if the defendants said it was true to their own knowledge, and they had
no knowledge on the subject, i.e., whether the balance sheet accurately reflected the
actual condition of the business, there would be no sincere belief, and therefore, the
statement would amount to fraud.6 4
Regardless of the court's intent, however, as a result of its position that
good faith was no defense if a false statement was certified as true to the
accountants' own knowledge, the accounting profession soon changed the
wording of its certificates. No longer is the word "certify" used. Instead,
accountants now state the results of their examination in the form of an
opinion and not a fact. Furthermore, an accountant who relies upon
sources of knowledge other than his own should specifically indicate that
in his report.65 Thus there is no pretense of knowledge as to the accuracy
of the information received.66
see Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 733,
734-35 (1929); Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liability for Defective Financial Reports,
15 Hastings L.J. 436, 451 (1964).
59. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
60. Id. at 174, 174 N.E. at 442 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
62. Id. (citations omitted).
63. Levitin, supra note 58, at 454.
64. Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for Negligence, 41 St. John's
L. Rev. 588, 594 (1967).
65. Levitin, supra note 58, at 454.
66. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio App. 241, 243, 191 N.E. 808, 809 (1934), where
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In addressing itself to the opinion portion of the defendants' certifica-
tion, the court in Ultramares stated that even "an opinion, especially an
opinion by an expert, may be found to be fraudulent if the grounds sup-
porting it are so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no
genuine belief back of it.'"7 Moreover, in distinguishing negligence from
fraud, the court stated:
Directors of corporations have been acquitted of liability for deceit though they
have been lax in investigation and negligent in speech . . . . This has not meant, to be
sure, that negligence may not be evidence from which a trier of the facts may draw
an inference of fraud ... but merely that if that inference is rejected, or, in the light
of all the circumstances, is found to be unreasonable, negligence alone is not a
substitute for fraud.68
In reversing the lower courts and granting a new trial as to the fraud
action, the court of appeals concluded:
In certifying to the correspondence between balance sheet and accounts the
defendants made a statement as true to their own knowledge, when they had, as a jury
might find, no knowledge on the subject. If that is so, they may also be found to have
acted without information leading to a sincere or genune belief when they certified
to an opinion that the balance sheet faithfully reflected the condition of the business. 00
Significantly, the court also rejected defendants' contention that what-
ever "wrong was committed by the defendants was not their personal act
or omission, but that of their subordinates."7 0 The court stated:
These subordinates, so far as the record shows, had no interests adverse to the
defendants', nor any thought in what they did to be unfaithful to their trust. The
question is merely this, whether the defendants, having delegated the performance of
this work to agents of their own selection, are responsible for the manner in which the
business of the agency was done. As to that the answer is not doubtful. 71
the auditors certified that they "have examined the books of account and record of Interna-
tional Match Corporation and its American Subsidiary . . . and have received statements
from abroad with respect to the foreign constituent companies . . . . Based upon our ex-
amination and information submitted to us it is our opinion that the annexed Consolidated
Balance Sheet sets forth the financial condition of the combined companies . . . ." After the
plaintiff had purchased stocks and bonds in said corporation in reliance on the auditors'
certification of the balance sheet, it was discovered that International Match Corporation was
bankrupt. The plaintiff instituted suit against the accountants for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions in connection with the foreign subsidiaries. In distinguishing Ultramares, the court In
Beardsley pointed out that the auditors of International Match Corporation fully disclosed
that their opinion was based on statements received from abroad, indicating that they had
not examined the records of the foreign subsidiaries and thus could not have known whether
or not said statements were accurate. Id. at 243, 191 N.E. at 810.
67. 255 N.Y. at 186, 174 N.E. at 447.
68. Id. (citations omitted).
69 Id. at 192-93, 174 N.E. at 449-50.
70. Id. at 193, 174 N.E. at 450.
71. Id. (citations omitted).
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Several years after Ultramares, the New York Court of Appeals had
an opportunity to review the accountants' third party liability for fraud
in State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst.72 In that case, Pelz-Greenstein ("Pelz")
was engaged in the factoring business and obtained most of its working
capital from borrowings. The defendant accountants certified73 for Pelz
10 copies of the latter's balance sheet reflecting assets of approximately
$8,000,000, debts of less than $5,000,000, unimpaired capital of over
$3,000,000 and a surplus of about $83,000. In fact, however, Pelz was
insolvent; and about a year after the date of defendants' certification,
Pelz was petitioned into bankruptcy.
Relying on the balance sheet, the plaintiff had extended credit to Pelz.
Shortly thereafter, the defendants submitted solely to Pelz a balance
sheet (similar to the ones originally certified) together with a covering
letter which contained comments and explanations thereof. This letter
contained statements of facts discovered by defendants in the course of
their audit, hence known by them at the time they certified the original
balance sheets. So important was this covering letter in the minds of the
defendants that attached to the accompanying balance sheet was a nota-
tion indicating that the balance sheet was subject to the comments con-
tained in the letter. No such notation, however, appeared on the originally
certified balance sheets. Evidence was also adduced at the trial that
certain receivables, aggregating approximately $2,000,000 and represent-
ing about 25% of Pelz's assets, were greatly overvalued, in that over
$768,000 of such accounts were alarmingly stagnant. Although the defen-
dants were aware of this general condition and had informed Pelz of the
condition of these receivables in their after-issued covering letter, they
did not reveal it on the originally certified balance sheets. Instead, a
reserve which was less than insignificant, and grossly inadequate to meet
anticipated losses from such defaulting receivables, was provided for in
the original statements. At the close of the trial the jury returned a plain-
tiff's verdict which was set aside by the trial judge, who directed a verdict
for defendants. The appellate division unanimously affirmed. The court
of appeals, in a 4-2 decision, reversed the judgments and ordered a new
72. 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
73. The certification in State Street, unlike that in Ultramares, contained no allegation
that the statement was in accordance with the books. Instead, the defendant accountants
certified: "We hereby certify that we examined the books of account and record [sic]
pertaining to the assets and liabilities of Pelz-Greenstein Co., Inc., New York City, as of the
close of business December 31, 1928, and, based on the records examined, information sub-
mitted to us, and subject to the foregoing notes [not here material], it is our opinion that
the above condensed statement shows the financial condition of the company at the date
stated and that the related income and surplus account is correct." Id. at 110, 15 N.E.2d at
418.
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trial, because it found abundant evidence from which a jury could infer
fraud on the part of the defendants. Reiterating the principles set forth
in Ultramares, the court reasoned:
We have held that in the absence of a contractual relationship or its equivalent,
accountants cannot be held liable for ordinary negligence in preparing a certified
balance sheet even though they are aware that the balance sheet will be used to obtain
credit. (Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170.) Accountants, however, may
be liable to third parties, even where there is lacking deliberate or active fraud. A
representation certified as true to the knowledge of the accountants when knowledge
there is none, a reckless misstatement, or an opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to
lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient
upon which to base liability. A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate the
doubtful, if sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to an inference of fraud
so as to impose liability for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance sheet. In
other words, heedlessness and reckless disregard of consequence may take the place of
deliberate intention. 74
Despite State Street's adherence to the principles of Ultramares, some
concern has been raised by the more recent case of Duro Sportswear, Inc.
v. Cogen.75 In Duro, an accountant was asked to certify a balance sheet
that he knew would form the basis of the purchase by one stockholder
of the interest of another in the corporation. The certified statement was
substantially erroneous. In holding the accountant liable for damages to
the purchaser who relied upon the report, the court specifically rejected a
finding of fraud and based liability on a finding of gross negligence on
the part of defendant. Although Duro was apparently based upon a mis-
74. State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 111-12, 15 N.E.2d 416, 418-19 (1938).
It is noteworthy that the majority opinion in State Street was written by Judge Finch, who,
while sitting in the appellate division, dissented from the judgment of that court for the
plaintiff in Ultramares, stating: "The professional man, be he accountant or otherwise,
certifies for his client and not for all the world. If the client makes it clear to such a man
that the statement is to be used in a particular transaction in which a third party is involved,
such circumstance should create a duty from the professional man to such third party. If the
accountant is to be held to an unlimited liability to all persons who may act on the faith of
the certificate, the accountant would be obliged to protect himself by a verification so rigid
that its cost might well be prohibitive and a limited but useful field of service thus closed to
him. The smallness of the compensation paid to the defendants for the services requested
is in striking contrast to the enormity of the liability now sought to he imposed upon them.
If in the case at bar the plaintiff had inquired of the accountants whether they might rely
upon the certificate in making a loan, then the accountants would have had the opportunity
to gauge their responsibility and risk, and determine with knowledge how thorough their
verification of the account should be before assuming the responsibility of making the certifi-
cate run to the plaintiff." 229 App. Div. 581, 587, 243 N.Y.S. 179, 186 (1st Dep't 1930), rev'd,
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
75. 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mem., 285 App. Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829
(1st Dep't 1955).
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interpretation of Ultramares and State Street," the result is justified under
Glanzer; for, in both Duro and Glanzer, the issuer knew the specific party
who would rely on the report and the specific use to which the report
would be put.
Having established that there is a general duty to third persons not
to misrepresent wilfully, we must consider the breadth of such duty. It is
clear that the general scope of liability in deceit is broader than in mere
negligence, which involves no intent to deceive. Accordingly, the fault of
the maker of the negligent misrepresentation is sufficiently less that a
narrower responsibility for its consequences is justified. While Ultramares
is best known for its negligence holding, it is equally significant in its
enlargement of the scope of liability for deceit.7" It extended liability for
fraud to persons whose identity was unknown to the defendant and whom
it was not the primary purpose of defendant to defraud."
Under the traditional English view,7" which was adopted by the Restate-
ment of Torts,80 liability for fraud is limited to those persons in whom the
defendant intended to induce reliance, and only if they relied in the man-
ner intended. Under Ultramares, however, the plaintiff need not show that
the defendant intended to induce his reliance; instead, it appears sufficient
to show that the defendant should reasonably have foreseen this possibil-
ity."' Recognizing that the present Restatement's position is too narrow,
the revisers are contemplating expansion of the scope of such liability
under section 531, as follows:
ONE WHO MAKES A FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION IS SUBJECT
TO LIABILITY FOR PECUNIARY LOSS
(a) TO THE PERSONS OR CLASS OF PERSONS WHOM HE INTENDS OR
HAS REASON TO EXPECT TO ACT OR TO REFRAIN FROM ACTION IN
RELIANCE UPON THE MISREPRESENTATION; AND
(b) FOR PECUNIARY LOSS SUFFERED BY THEM THROUGH THEIR
RELIANCE IN THE TYPE OF TRANSACTION IN WHICH HE INTENDS OR
HAS REASON TO EXPECT THEIR CONDUCT TO BE INFLUENCED. 82
While thus extending the scope of liability, the revisers note that they
76. See Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for Negligence, 41 St.
John's L. Rev. 588, 593 (1967).
77. Seavey, supra note 36, at 402.
78. Id. at 404.
79. See Peek v. Gurney, [1873] L.R. 6 Eng. & Ir. App. 377; W. Prosser, Torts § 102, at
717 (3d ed. 1964).
80. Restatement of Torts § 531 (1938).
81. Levitin, supra note 58, at 455.
82. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531, at 95 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) (emphasis
added).
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express "no opinion as to whether the liability stated in this Section may
extend to other persons or other types of transactions, if reliance upon
the representation in acting or in refraining from action may reasonably
be foreseen."83
The accountants' common law liability for fraud has also been con-
sidered recently in Fischer v. Kletz,8 4 a case of potential landmark signif-
icance. 5 Unlike most cases of deceit, which involve affirmative misrepre-
sentations by the defendant, the plaintiffs there attacked the accountants'
nondisclosure, or silence, as the basis of the misrepresentation.
In Fischer, the accountants, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. ("PMM"),
certified the financial statements of Yale Express System, Inc. ("Yale")
included in Yale's 1963 annual report to stockholders which was distrib-
uted in April, 1964. Several months thereafter, a Form 10-K Report,
containing the same financial statements as the annual report, was filed
by Yale with the SEC as required by that agency's rules and regulations.
Early in 1964, Yale engaged PMM to conduct certain "special studies"
of its finances. In the course of these special studies, the accountants dis-
covered that the figures previously certified in the annual report were
substantially false and misleading. They failed, however, to disclose these
facts to the exchanges on which Yale was traded, to the SEC or to the
public at large until May, 1965 when the special studies were released.
It was this nondisclosure of subsequently discovered facts that formed
the basis of plaintiffs' common law action against PMM.
In deciding that the common law action of deceit was not insufficient
as a matter of law, the court in Fischer considered the extent of the duty
to disclose after-acquired information. PMM contended that such a duty
exists only to a "party to a business transaction," and thus is inapplicable
to an independent auditor.86 To this the court countered:
The parties and the SEC have not supplied, nor has the court found, any cases which
analyze the issue raised by this contention within a factual framework involving non-
disclosure of information which makes a prior representation false. As the ensuing
discussion will show, however, this does not mean that plaintiffs' cause of action for
deceit must be dismissed at this stage of this litigation, nor does it preclude a rational
analysis of the issue raised by defendant.
83. Id. at 96.
84. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
85. Also considered were alleged violations of §§ 10(b) and 18 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934; see pp. 216, 218-19 infra. Specifically before the court was the defen-
dants' cross-motion to dismiss certain paragraphs in the plaintiffs' complaint; for purposes
of deciding this, the court primarily accepted the truth of plaintiffs' allegations in the com-
plaint.
86. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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In cases involving affirmative misrepresentations, it is now the settled rule that a
misrepresenter can be held liable, regardless of his interest in the transaction.
In my view, accepting the pertinent allegations of the complaint to be true, PMM
must be regarded as bound at this preliminary stage of the litigation by this rule of
law. Though concededly "disinterested" in the sense that it achieved no advantage by
its silence, PMM is charged in the complaint for losses realized by plaintiffs as a
result of its nondisclosure. This is sufficient, at least in the pleading sense, under the
cases discussed, save for one remaining problem-whether or not plaintiffs must plead
and ultimately prove intent by PMM to deceive by its silence.sr
On this issue of PMM's intent, the court stated:
Careful reflection upon the ramifications of the basic rules of deceit liability con-
strain me to reject this argument, pending full resolution of the facts of this case.
Liability in a case of nondisclosure is based upon the breach of a duty imposed by
the demands of "good faith and common honesty." Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. at 373. The
imposition of the duty creates an objective standard against which to measure a
defendant's actions and leaves no room for an analysis of the subjective considerations
inherent in the area of intent. Thus, to base liability in part upon subjective standards
of intent of the nondisclosing defendant would blur and weaken the objective basis of
impact of nondisclosure upon the plaintiff. In the alternative, if this rationale be
deemed unacceptable, it can be persuasively urged that in a nondisclosure case, intent
can be sensibly imputed to a defendant who, knowing that plaintiff will rely upon his
original representations, sits by silently when they turn out to be false.88
In recognizing a cause of action for deceit, the court was not unmindful
of the issues of public policy that had to be resolved, stating:
In the light of the foregoing discussion, I find no sound reasons to justify barring
plaintiffs from the opportunity to prove a common-law action of deceit against PM.1.
It is true that each case cited and discussed above is factually distinguishable from the
case at bar. But the distinctions create no presently discernible, substantial differences
of law or policy. The common law has long required that a person who has made a
representation must correct that representation if it becomes false and if he knows
people are relying on it. This duty to disclose is imposed regardless of the interest of
defendant in the representation and subsequent nondisclosure. Plaintiffs have suffi-
ciently alleged the elements of nondisclosure on the part of this "disinterested"
defendant. Accordingly, they must be given an opportunity to prove those allegations.
To conclude thus is not to ignore the manifold difficulties that a final determination
of liability on the part of public accountants for nondisclosure would create for pro-
fessional firms and other business entities (and, indeed, individuals) similarly
situated. Some obvious questions can be briefly set forth as examples of such potential
problems. How long, for instance, does the duty to disclose after-acquired informa-
tion last? To whom and how should disclosure be made? Does liability exist if the
after-acquired knowledge is obtained from a source other than the original supplier of
information? Is there a duty to disclose if an associate or employee of the accounting
87. Id. at 186-88 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 188.
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firm discovers that the financial statements are false but fails to report it to the firm
members?
These and similar questions briefly indicate the potentially significant impact upon
accountants, lawyers and business entities in the event that a precise rule or rules of
liability for nondisclosure are fashioned and recognized in the law. On the other side of
the coin, however, as the bulk of the discussion hereinbefore has shown, investors in
publicly-held companies have a strong interest in being afforded some degree of
protection by and from those professional and business persons whose representations
are relied upon for decisional purposes. In my view, resolution of the issues posed by
the complaint allegations here in question must be made with these important but
conflicting interests in mind. Proper reconciliation of these interests or policy con-
siderations, however, can only be made after full development of the facts of this case
during the discovery process and at trial.8 9
Moreover, suppose the after-acquired information was obtained as a re-
sult of a special study made by the accountants under circumstances which
would normally give rise to its protection as a privileged communication.
To what extent would the accountants' obligation to disclose conflict with
the client's right to assert such privilege?
The ultimate solutions the law will find to these weighty problems are
beyond the scope of present speculation. Whatever the outcome, however,
there can be little doubt of the far-reaching ramifications each extension
of such liability carries with it. Moreover, although conceptually the scope
of third party liability is clearly greater for fraud than for purely
negligent misrepresentations, the effect of holding that a jury might infer
fraud from negligent misrepresentations is largely to diminish, in practice,
the distinction between the two. As it has been aptly put, if "the defendant
has been guilty of seriously wrongful conduct, we can trust to the jury to
take care of the equities in the situation."'"
C. Liability Under Federal Securities Laws
Between 1920 and 1933, American investors purchased nearly fifty
billion dollars of new securities issues. 2 On the average, the public pur-
chasers of such securities were not supplied with sufficient information
concerning their purchases so as to make an informed investment. By
1933, approximately half of these newly issued securities-about twenty-
five billion dollars worth-had become worthless.9 3 Accordingly, the
Securities Act of 193311 ("Securities Act" or "1933 Act") was passed to
89. Id. at 188-89 (emphasis added).
90. See Katsoris, Confidential Communications-The Accountants' Dilemma, 35 Fordham
L. Rev. 51 (1966).
91. Seavey, supra note 36, at 404.
92. Pines, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Accounting Principles, 30 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 727 (1965).
93. Id.
94. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
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provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold to the
public through the mails or in interstate commerce. The very next year
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 19349" ("Exchange Act"
or "1934 Act"). Whereas the 1933 Act is concerned primarily with the
initial distribution of securities, the 1934 Act was enacted primarily to
deal with post-distribution trading. Both of these acts require the filing of
financial data; both are administered by the SEC;9  and both contain
civil liability provisions, which in the aggregate substantially expand the
accountants' common law liability to third persons for misrepresentations.
While the accountants' principal exposure to civil liabilities under these
two Acts will be explored briefly, this paper will not deal with the ac-
countants' potential civil liabilities incurred in the performance of their
duties under other federal securities law.97
1. The Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act "was designed not only to prevent fraud in the sale
of securities and to provide investors with adequate information but also
to protect legitimate enterprises seeking to obtain capital honestly through
factual disclosure against dishonest competition. 0 8 This Act requires the
inclusion in the registration statement (prospectus) of balance sheets and
profit and loss statements "in such detail and such form" as the SEC
shall prescribe,9 9 and provides that such financial statements shall be
certified by an "independent public or certified accountant."'"
The Securities Act provides for civil liability in sections 11, 12 and
15.101 Of the three, only section 11 directly involves the accountant. Sub-
division (a) of that section provides that whenever a registration state-
ment becomes effective, containing
an untrue statement of a material fact or [which has] omitted to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mis-
95. 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7Shh (1964).
96. The SEC was created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. For the one year prior
thereto, the Securities Act of 1933 was administered by the Federal Trade Commission.
97. E.g., Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803 (1935), as amended, 15 US.C. §§ 79 to
79z-6 (1964); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77aaa-77bbb (1964), as amended (Supp. II, 1965-66) ; Investment Company Act of 1940,
54 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ S0a-I to 80a-52 (1964) ; Investment Advisers
Act~of 1940, 54 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ Sob-i to S0b-21 (1964), as
amended (Supp. II, 1965-66).
98. Pines, supra note 92, at 727.
99. Schedule A, paras. 25-26, 48 Stat. 90 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25)-(26)
(1964).
100. Id.
101. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964); 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964); 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
19671
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
leading, any person acquiring such security ... may, either at law or in equity, in any
court of competent jurisdicton, sue-
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives
authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as having
prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having prepared or
certified any report or valuation which is used in connection with the registration
statement, with respect to the statement in such registration statement, report, or
valuation, which purports to have been prepared or certified by him .... 102
A simple, all-inclusive definition as to what error or omission is material
is an impossibility. What is material in one factual pattern may be in-
significant in another. Accordingly, materiality must generally be deter-
mined on a case-to-case basis. By Section 22,103 jurisdiction to enforce
such liability is conferred concurrently on the federal district and terri-
torial courts, and the state and territorial courts. In addition, this section
contains broad venue and process provisions in connection with these
suits. The measure of damages collectible under section 11 is outlined in
great detail in subdivision (e) thereof. 10 4 In no case can the amount
recovered exceed the price at which the security was offered to the
public."°5 While enacting these elaborate damage provisions, however,
Congress gave a defendant, such as an accountant, an important defense,
whereby damages may be reduced to the extent he proves that they did
not result from his misconduct. 00 Moreover, section 13 of the Securities
Act bars actions under section 11 unless "brought within one year after
102. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964) (emphasis added). See
Rule 2-05 of SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-05 (1967), which provides: "If, with respect
to the certification of the financial statements of any person, the principal accountant relies
on an examination made by another independent public accountant of certain of the accounts
of such person or its subsidiaries, the certificate of such other accountant shall be filed (and
the provisions of §§ 210.2-01 and 210.2-02 shall be applicable thereto) ; however, the certifi-
cate of such other accountant need not be filed (a) if no reference is made directly or indi-
rectly to such other accountant's examination in the principal accountant's certificate, or (b)
if, having referred to such other accountant's examination, the principal accountant states in
his certificate that he assumes responsibility for such other accountant's examination in the
same manner as if it had been made by him."
103. 48 Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1964).
104. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964). Generally, such damages
are the difference between the purchase price (not exceeding the price at which the security
was offered to the public) and "(1) the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought,
or (2) the price at which such security shall have been disposed of in the market before
suit, or (3) the price at which such security shall have been disposed of after suit but before
judgment if such damages shall be less than the damages representing the difference between
the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security was offered to
the public) and the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought." Id.
105. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (1964).
106. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964).
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the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such dis-
covery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence,"
but in no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability
against the accountant under section 11 "more than three years after the
security was bona fide offered to the public."'07
Although section 11 is a significant expansion of the accountants' com-
mon law third party liability, the number of suits brought by investors
under the section has been relatively small.' How then do the substan-
tive requisites of section 11 generally compare with those of common law
liability? The accountants' liability to investors under the Securities Act
is but a further expansion of the assault on the "citadel of privity." Spe-
cifically, section 11 inures to the benefit of purchasers who were unaware
of the untruth or omission at the time of their acquisition."' ° The section
does not require that the mails have been used, nor does it matter whether
the purchaser bought his securities in interstate or intrastate commerce. 10
Subject to the limitations provisions of section 13, he has standing to sue
regardless of whether he purchased his securities at the time of the
original offer or at some later date."' Consequently, not only is it im-
material that privity is totally lacking between the accountant and the
investor, but it is also of no consequence that the misrepresentation was
neither addressed to him nor intended to influence him.
Proof of reliance, so essential to the imposition of common law third
party liability in both negligence and deceit, is eliminated under the
section, except that:
If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made generally available
to its security holders an earning statement covering a period of at least twelve months
beginning after the effective date of the registration statement, then the right of
recovery under this subsection shall be conditioned on proof that such person acquired
the security relying upon such untrue statement in the registration statement or relying
upon the registration statement and not knowing of such omission, but such reliance
may be established without proof of the reading of the registration statement by such
person.112
107. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, I5 U.S.C. § 77m (1964).
108. This has been attributed not only to the care with which the legal and accounting
professions prepare registration statements, but also the SEC's vigilance in examining same.
3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1690 (1961).
109. See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). A suit under
§ 11, however, is limited to the purchasers of securities that are the direct subject of the
prospectus and registration statement. Accordingly, purchasers of common stock cannot sue
under § 11 by reason of a prospectus and registration statement for the sale of preferred
stock.
110. 3 L. Loss, supra note 108, at 1731.
111. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1933).
112. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964).
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The rationale behind this is that in all likelihood the purchase and price
of the security bought after the publication of such an earning statement
will be based on that statement rather than upon the information in the
registration statement."'
Nor does the alleviation of plaintiff's burden end there. The term
scienter-the backbone of a fraud action-is conspicuously absent from
the terminology of section 11. Accordingly, no proof of fraud or deceit
is necessary. 114 Indeed, under the strict and absolute liability provisions
of the section, the plaintiff need not even show mere negligence on the
accountants' part. Generally, he must only demonstrate his standing to
sue and the falsity or misleading character of the financial statements.
Once he has sustained this burden, it is incumbent upon the defendant to
come forward with the defenses provided him under the Act.
As to defendants generally (other than the issuer), with respect to
parts of the registration statement purporting to be made on the authority
of experts (other than the defendant in question) or of official persons,
they need only show, inter alia, that they had no reasonable ground to
believe, and did not believe, that the statements were untrue or that there
was an omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading."" As to the
expert himself (such as an accountant), he is provided with immunity
from liability if he can show that "he had, after reasonable investigation,
reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the
registration statement became effective, that the statements therein were
true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mislead-
ing," or that the part of the registration statement in question did not
fairly represent his statement as an expert." 0 The Act defines this stan-
dard of "reasonable investigation" and "reasonable ground" for belief as
"that required of a prudent man in the management of his own
property. '117
This very standard was in issue in Shonts v. Hirliman,"8 a suit under
113. H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
114. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
115. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 77k(b)(3)(c),(D) (1964).
116. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (A) (1964). The Act also
specifically sets up exculpatory provisions if the accountant wishes to sever his connection or
duties before the effective date of that portion of the registration allocated to him, 48 Stat.
82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1) (1964), or if he discovers, after such effective
date, that part of such statement became effective without his knowledge. 48 Stat. 82 (1933),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(2) (1964).
117. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1964).
118. 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
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section 11 by purchasers of registered securities to recover damages from
(among others) the accountants who certified the financial statements in
the registration statement. It was alleged that these financials made no
mention of a material fact, namely, the obligation of the registrant to pay
a minimum rental of $35,000-an undertaking that was being discussed,
but not actually incurred until after the accountants' last certification.
In exonerating the auditors for their failure to show this amount as a
contingent liability, the court reasoned:
No misstatement or omission appears in the registration statement until after the last
certificate of Webster, Atz & Co., dated January 19, 1937. Prior to January 31, 1937,
there were merely discussions of rental, and no definite undertaking by either side or
guarantee of a minimum, which was binding on the company. The failure of the
certificate of Webster, Atz & Co. to set up the rental undertaking and the minimum
guarantee of $35,000 as a contingent liability, is not the omission of anything which
existed then. The rental arrangement was not called to their attention. There was no
entry on the books at their disposal, from which, by further inquiry, they might have
discovered that there was such an undertaking. Absent these, they cannot be charged
with a misrepresentation which was made later-long after their certification.' 19
Whether the norm set by Shonts meets the test of reasonableness "required
of a prudent man in the management of his own property," has been ques-
tioned. 2 ' In this connection, it has been stated:
As far as the independent accountant is concerned, it appears that the law imposes
a duty which does not end with the signing of his certificate and consent and the filing
of the registration statement. It means that after the filing and up to the effective date,
the accountant must take reasonable steps to ascertain whether anything has happened
in the interim which materially affects the statements he certifies. This is a responsi-
bility which, it is true, he shares with others, but it is not a good defense to say that
his responsibility is only secondary, that the primary responsibility is the registrant's.
Suppose, for example, that on the date of the statements and on the filing date an
important lawsuit was pending, as to which no provision had been or could be made
for an adverse decision. Shortly after the filing date, a decision is handed down against
the registrant. Under the law, unless this information is included in the registration
statement, it might be construed as an omission of a material fact which would subject
those participating in the registration to the liabilities provided in the statute.
It seems clear that the obligation of the certifying accountant does not end with the
filing of the registration statement; he may not thereafter relax his vigilance and simply
sit back and wait for the SEC's memorandum of comments, and, ultimately, the effec-
tive date. On the other hand, the independent accountant as a practical matter cannot
be expected to keep his audit going continuously until the effective date; this may take
weeks or even months. I have not interpreted the clause "at the time Stch part of the
registration statement became effective" as requiring the accountant to continue his
examination of the books and records to the effective date. It should be his practice,
however, to keep in touch with the financial affairs of his client in some manner.121
119. Id. at 483.
120. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 108, at 1733.
121. Rappaport, Accountant's Responsibility for Events Occurring after the Statement
Date: the Shonts Case, J. Accountancy, March, 1953, at 333 (emphasis added).
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2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
With the economic disaster of the Great Depression still taking its toll,
it was obvious to the 73rd Congress that healthy, honest and constructive
investments in securities could be encouraged only by eliminating many
of the dangerous and unfair practices that had bred prior speculation. It
was recognized that such dangerous speculation was not caused solely by
defects and abuses in the stock exchange machinery, but was equally
festered by an inadequate central control of a national credit system
which too easily provided funds for speculation, by inadequate corporate
reporting which kept the public in ignorance and by exploitation of that
ignorance by a self-perpetuating management with inside information. 122
It was against this background that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
was enacted.
The Exchange Act requires the filing of registration applications and
annual and other reports with the SEC by companies whose securities
are listed upon the national exchanges. By virtue of the 1964 Securities
Acts amendments, 123 such reporting requirements have been extended to
most issues traded in the over the counter market. 2 4 As with most
filings under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the financial statements must be
prepared in accordance with SEC Regulation S-X, and generally must be
certified by independent public or certified accountants. 2 '
Accountants' liability for misleading statements under the Exchange
Act is generally founded upon the specific provisions of section 18,120
and the implied provisions of section 10(b) 1 27 and SEC rule 10b-5.128
Although the venue requirements of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts are
liberal, section 27 of the Exchange Act (unlike section 22 of the Securities
Act which gives state courts concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
courts129 ) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts over violations
of the 1934 Act or rules or regulations thereunder.3 0 However, section
28 of the 1934 Act also provides:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all
other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person permitted
122. See H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
123. 78 Stat. 565 (1964).
124. See Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
1964 Duke L.J. 706.
125. See Lee & Hall, Accounting Aspects Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 20 Bus.
Law. 325 (1965).
126. 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
127. 48 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967).
129. 48 Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1964).
130. 48 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964). See also 3 L. Loss, supra
note 108, at 2005.
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to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover.
through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of
his actual damages on account of the act complained of. 1 3 1
a) Section 18
Section 18 provides in part:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application,
report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation there-
under . . . which statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances
under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall
be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who,
in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price
which was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the
person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such
statement was false or misleading.l 2
Like section 11 of the 1933 Act, it requires that the plaintiff did not
know the statement was false or misleading, and that the misleading or
false portion be material. Moreover, section 18 requires reliance on the
part of the plaintiff, but, unlike section 11 of the 1933 Act, there is no
provision that reliance may be established without proof that the plaintiff
read the particular document. In addition, section 18 exonerates the
defendant if he acted in good faith, without knowledge of the misleading
or false character of the statement. Concerning this defense, Professor
Loss has stated: "Aside from the shift in the burden of proof to the defen-
dant, this seems to be first cousin to scienter."M 33
Unlike section 11 of the 1933 Act, section 18 is available to sellers as
weli as buyers; however, such plaintiffs must prove that they purchased
or sold the security at a price which was affected by such statement. It is
this requirement of causation that may explain the minimal use of this
section:
Except for avoiding any question that the person making the false statement or
causing it to be made can be sued by the buyer or seller notwithstanding the absence
of privity between them, it is hard to see what advantage § IS gives the investor that
he does not have in common law deceit, where (if he has a right of action at all) he
might at least be able to avoid proving, under traditional concepts of causation and
reliance, that he had bought or sold at a price affected by the false statemenLt '
In any event, section 18 suits are barred unless instituted within "one year
after the discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action and within
three years after such cause of action accrued."M 35
131. 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964 .
132. 48 Stat. 897-98 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78r(a) (1964).
133. 3 L. Loss, supra note 108, at 1752.
134. Id.
135. 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1964).
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Section 18 liability was also recently sought in Fischer v. Kletz. 10
There the plaintiffs alleged that the accountants knew before the filing
with the SEC of the Form 10-K report by the client that the financial
statements, certified by the defendants, were false, and that by allowing
the statements to be filed, the accountants in effect caused a false certifi-
cate to be filed with the SEC. Since the accountants denied any such
knowledge at the time the 10-K Report was filed, the court denied, with-
out prejudice, the defendants' pretrial cross-motion to dismiss the section
18 liability "until the facts are more fully developed."' 37
b) Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
Unlike the specificity of section 18, section 10(b) very simply provides
that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.' 38
Pursuant to this authority, SEC rule 10b-5 was promulgated, which
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
136. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also pp. 206-08 supra; pp. 218-19 infra.
137. 266 F. Supp. at 189.
138. 48 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964). Note that unlike § 11 of
the 1933 Act, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act applies not only to purchasers of securities, but also to
sellers. Accordingly, a stockholder's derivative action is maintainable to recover damages under
§ 10(b) where the corporation has been injured as a result of a sale, issuance or purchase of
its own shares. See Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). Nor is § 10(b)
limited to damages arising from misrepresentations that overstate financial condition or
operations. Id. Moreover, the act or omission complained of under § 10(b) must be material-
that is whether a reasonable person would attach importance to the fact misrepresented in
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question. List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
258 F. Supp. 262, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security. 39
Although neither section 10(b) nor rule 10b-5 explicitly provide for
any civil liabilities, it is well established that by making the conduct it
describes unlawful, section 10(b) creates a civil remedy. 4" Once having
found civil liability under the section, courts were confronted with the fact
that the language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is so vague as to create
almost completely undefined liability. Thus, it has been authoritatively
stated:
Literally all that the rule seems to require is proof of (1) some fraud or material
misstatement (which, by construction, may be satisfied by the defendant's silence
when he has a duty to speak) in connection with the purchase or sale of a security and
(2) use of the mails or of some interstate or stock exchange facility. Indeed, the
plaintiff is not limited to proving an untrue statement or an omission but has recourse
to the possibly broader "fraud" language of the first and third clauses of the rule.141
Despite the fact that the headnote to section 10(b) reads "Manipula-
tive and deceptive devices," no mention is made in the section, or in rule
10b-5, of the elements of common law deceit-reliance, scienter and
causation. Accordingly, their application to private actions under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 is not entirely clear.4 2 Although privity no longer
appears to be an essential ingredient of the cause of action,1 43 some sem-
blance of causal relation'" and reliance" 5 still seems essential. Whether
scienter is still required to state a claim under the three clauses of rule
10b-5 is presently being authoritatively questioned.'"
In addition, section 10(b)-unlike section 11 of the 1933 Act and
section 18 of the 1934 Act-makes no provision for the furnishing of an
undertaking for the payment of the costs of a suit instituted under its
provisions. Moreover, neither section 10(b) nor rule lob-5 specifies any
139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967).
140. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 108, at 1763.
141. Id. at 1764-65.
142. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 277.
143. Comment, Civil Liability Under Section 10B and Rule 10B-5: A Suggestion for
Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale L.J. 658, 663-65 (1965).
144. 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 22781.08 at 16,635.
145. Id.; 3 L. Loss., supra note 108, at 1765-66. But cf. Comment, Civil Liability Under
Section 10B and Rule 10B-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale
L.J. 658, 673-75 (1965), where traditional concepts of reliance seem inappropriate in the
case of misleading omissions, since the plaintiff "will have knowledge only of silence."
146. See A. Bromberg, Securities Law-Fraud-SEC Rule 10b-5, § 2.6(1) (1967); Com-
ment, supra note 145, at 674; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 277 (S.D.\N.Y. 1966). But see 3 L. Loss, supra note 108 at
1766; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Weber v. C.M.P. Corp.,
242 F. Supp. 321, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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applicable statute of limitations, or the availability of the defenses of
waiver, estoppel or laches; discussion of these, however, is beyond the
scope of this article.'47
Specific application of section 10(b) to accountants was made in i. L.
Green Co. v. Childree.148 In that case, a corporation that had exchanged
its stock in a merger for stock of the audited company sued the auditors
under rule lOb-5, alleging that they had knowingly prepared false finan-
cial statements and made other misrepresentations with intent to induce
plaintiff to enter into the merger. In denying the defendants' motion to
dismiss the cause of action, the court stated:
The complaint alleges that these defendants knowingly did acts pursuant to a
conspiracy to defraud. Their status as accountants and the fact that their activities
were confined to the preparation of false and misleading financial statements and
representations does not immunize these defendants from civil suit for their alleged
participation. 149
A more recent application of section 10(b) liability to accountants was
also sought in Fischer v. Kletz.'9 0 In considering such liability arising out
of the accountants' certification of Yale's annual report financials and
subsequent silence as to their after-acquired information, the court pon-
dered such issues as:
(i) the relationship between plaintiffs and defendant-accountants;
(ii) whether it is necessary that the accountants realized some gain
from the malfeasance;
(iii) whether it is necessary that the accountants conspired with, or
aided or abetted others;
(iv) whether the accountants' activities must be in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities;
and finally concluded:
From the foregoing discussion, it can readily be seen that that branch of PMM's
motion to dismiss any claims based on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 raises novel and
difficult issues. Because of the importance of the questions involved and the need for
further factual and legal development of them by the parties and the SEC, I deem it
best to deny this branch of PMM's motion without prejudice to renewal at trial.101
The plaintiffs in Fischer also sought to impose 10(b) liability on the
accountants on the basis of the false 10-K report, alleging that the latter
147. As to the issue of limitation, see 3 L. Loss, supra note 108, at 1771-77; A. Bromberg,
supra note 146, at § 2.5(1). As to the issue of defenses, see Comment, Applicability of Waiver,
Estoppel, and Laches Defenses to Private Suits Under the Securities Act and S.E.C. Rule
1OB-5: Deterrence and Equity in Balance, 73 Yale L.J. 1477 (1964).
148. 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
149. Id. at 96.
150. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also pp. 206-08, 216 supra.
151. 266 F. Supp. at 194 (emphasis added).
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"aided and abetted" Yale (in defrauding its creditors) in two ways:
"first, by remaining silent when it was known that the interim reports
were false and, second, by recommending or sanctioning the issuance of
the reports."'15 2 In failing to grant the defendants' cross-motion as to the
insufficiency of these allegations, the court concluded:
It is, however, inappropriate to make a determination of the "aiding and abetting"
issue at this time. Discovery is presently in a relatively inadvanced stage. While
plaintiffs can now show only minimal interaction between PMM and Yale in relation
to the interim statements, they must be given an opportunity to further explore this
facet of the Yale-PMM relationship. "The very fact that this case arises in a newly
developing area of law cautions that the court should refrain from abstract and pre-
mature legal determinations fashioned in an evidentiary vacuum."10
III. WHERE Do WE Go FROm HERE?
The current trend among creditors and investors is to attempt to im-
pose liability for their respective losses on the accountant. Such liability
is often termed essential if the financial community is to put any reliance
upon the accountant's certificate. Its need has also been couched in
various terms of moral duty, namely, that as between the innocent in-
vestor or creditor and the accountant upon whose report they rely, risk
of loss should fall on the accountant. Moreover, as the arguments go, this
great public need can be funded by greater insurance coverage and higher
fees. On the other hand, however, cries are raised that an accountant can-
not, as a practical matter, be an insurer of the financial statements he
certifies.' 54 Unfortunately, this controversy leaves the accountant in a
state of turmoil as to the practical economics of practicing his profession.
Accountants' professional civil liability to third persons is nestled in
two great bodies of substantive law-(i) the common law and statutory
codifications or alterations thereof of the states, and (ii) the statutory
obligations imposed by the federal securities laws. As to the former, dif-
ferences exist among the states, which are compounded by traditional
concepts of conflicts of laws. Accordingly, it has been suggested that a
model statute be enacted in all the states which "would articulate the
152. Id. at 195.
153. Id. at 197 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
154. In reporting a speech of Walter E. Hanson (senior partner of Peat, Manvick,
Mitchell & Co.) delivered before the New York State Bar Association, the New York Tunes
quoted:
"'The ingenuity of man . . .is unlimited. The cost of inviolate controls is prohibitive. If
there is creative deception-if information is withheld-there is nothing within reason that the
independent accountant, or anyone else, can do, even with the help of a computer, to assure
the timely disclosure of such activity."' Heinemann, Accountant Role Undergoing Tests, N.Y.
Times, March 27, 1966, at 1, col. 5.
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nature of the accountant's liability in areas not now covered by the secu-
rities legislation."' 55
Although such a result would indeed be welcome, the chances of attain-
ing such uniformity are unfortunately negligible. Suffice it to say, for
purposes of this article, that this area of the law must remain in the hands
of judicial interpretation which, so far, has been generally acceptable to
the accounting profession. Hopefully, by maintaining high standards com-
mensurate with the skills of the profession, by the use of appropriate dis-
claimers or qualified certificates, and through flexible insurance coverage,
the accountants can continue to live within the common law and statutory
framework of the states' substantive laws.
A more troublesome area, however, is the broader liability imposed by
the federal securities laws in favor of investors. Moreover, there are those
who urge that these laws should be extended even further to inure to the
benefit of creditors generally. Whether this is a desirable objective is a
debatable question. Regardless, however, of the broad channels into which
the currents of public policy will guide us, some reflection should be cast
upon the dilemma facing those engaged in practicing SEC accounting.
A. Should the Government Assume the Certification of SEC Financials?
The requirement that the bulk of SEC financials be certified by inde-
pendent public or certified accountants is neither accidental nor recent.
The accountants' role as to such certification has been summarized, as
follows:
The passage of the Securities Act, however, is an important landmark in the devel-
opment of the concept of the responsibility of the independent accountant to the
investor and the public. The original draft of the Securities Act did not require
certification by independent accountants. A representative of the accounting profession
appeared at the hearings on the bill before the Committee on Banking and Currency
of the United States Senate to suggest revisions of the bill. He pointed out that the
bill as drafted imposed "highly technical responsibilities upon the Commission as to
accounting principles, their proper application and their clear expression in financial
statements," and suggested the bill be revised to require that "the accounts pertaining
to such balance sheet, statement of income and surplus shall have been examined by
an independent accountant and his report shall present his certificate wherein he shall
express his opinion as to the correctness of the assets, liabilities, reserves, capital and
surplus as of the balance sheet date and also the income statement for the period
indicated."
The committee considered at length the value to investors and to the public of an
audit by accountants not connected with the company or management and whether
the additional expense to industry of an audit by independent accountants was justi-
fied by the expected benefits to the public. The committee also considered the advisa-
bility and feasibility of requiring the audit to be made by accountants on the staff of
the agency administering the Act.
155. Note, The Accountant's Liability-for What and to Whom, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 319,
330 (1951).
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In the report on the bill the Senate committee stated that it was intended that those
responsible for the administration and enforcement of the law should have full and
adequate authority to procure whatever information might be necessary in carrying
out the provisions of the bill, but it was deemed essential to refrain from placing upon
any Federal agency the duty of passing judgment upon the soundness of any security.
The proposal to require certification by independent public accountants was incor-
porated in the bill as passed.' 56
The question arises, however, whether the public accountant has outlived
his usefulness as a financial watchdog. 57
With increasing frequency, the accountant's status of "independence"
is being challenged. It has been suggested, with some merit, that in per-
forming various other services for a client (for example, management
consulting) he becomes inextricably associated with its management and
tends to lose a certain degree of objectivity.5 8 In the past, the SEC has
dealt with this problem of "independence" by issuing numerous rulings
on the subject.' There appears to be no reason why it cannot continue
to deal with this problem in the same manner.
Assuming, therefore, the independence of the public accountant, one
can hardly conclude that government auditors would perform this public
trust more proficiently. It is even questionable whether the government
could perform such certification services more cheaply, particularly in
view of the public accountant's greater familiarity with the clients' affairs,
gained while performing related accounting functions. Moreover, such a
change would arouse great antipathy among vast sectors of the business
community that would not like government auditors investigating every
nook and cranny of their supposedly unregulated affairs under the guise
of performing an auditing function.
Although changes in administering auditing procedures and the estab-
lishment of more reliable criteria of reporting should constantly be ex-
plored, the inherent dangers of relying upon financial statements will not
be lessened by replacing the independent public auditor with one who is
government employed. The present system of certification by independent
public auditors does not prevent the SEC from exercising its broad
authority to determine the propriety of the financial statements filed with
it.'6 0 Besides, it is unlikely that the government would be willing to under-
156. SEC Accounting Ser. Release No. 81, Dec. 11, 1958, 23 Fed. Reg. 9777 (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
157. See Pines, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Accounting Principles, 30
Law & Contemp. Prob. 727, 751 (1965).
158. See Cohen, The SEC and Accountants: Co-Operative Efforts to Improve Financial
Reporting, J. Accountancy, Dec., 1966, at 56, 67.
159. See SEC Accounting Ser. Release No. 81, supra note 156, dealing with the Inde-
pendence of Certifying Accountants, Compilation of Representative Administrative Rulings
in Cases Involving the Independence of Accountants.
160. See, e.g., SEC Accounting Ser. Release No. 96, Jan. 10, 1963, 28 Fed. Reg. 586. See
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write the losses incurred by investors in the event of a false or misleading
statement. Furthermore, it is no more feasible than before for the govern-
ment to be put in the impractical position of passing judgment upon the
soundness of any security. In short, the conclusion that SEC financial
statements should be certified by independent public accountants is as
compelling today as it was some thirty-five years ago.
B. Accountants' Certificates and Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles
The accountant's certificate under SEC Regulation S-X 1' 1 must
contain (i) a representation as to the audit conducted:
The accountant's certificate (i) shall state whether the audit was made in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards; and (ii) shall designate any auditing
procedures generally recognized as normal, or deemed necessary by the accountant
under the circumstances of the particular case, which have been omitted, and the
reasons for their omission. 162
and, (ii) the expression of an opinion:
The accountant's certificate shall state clearly: (1) The opinion of the accountant
in respect of the financial statements covered by the certificate and the accounting
principles and practices reflected therein; (2) the opinion of the accountant as to any
material changes in accounting principles or practices or method of applying the
accounting principles or practices, or adjustments of the accounts, required to be set
forth by § 210.3-07; and (3) the nature of, and the opinion of the accountant as to,
any material differences between the accounting principles and practices reflected in
the financial statements and those reflected in the accounts after the entry of adjust-
ments for the period under review.1e
also SEC Accounting Ser. Release No. 4, April 25, 1938, 11 Fed. Reg. 10913, which provides,
inter alia: "In cases where financial statements filed with this Commission pursuant to Its
rules and regulations under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
are prepared in accordance with accounting principles for which there is no substantial
authoritative support, such financial statements will be presumed to be misleading or
inaccurate despite disclosures contained in the certificate of the accountant or in footnotes to
the statements provided the matters involved are material. In cases where there is a difference
of opinion between the Commission and the registrant as to the proper principles of accounting
to be followed, disclosure will be accepted in lieu of correction of the financial statements
themselves only if the points involved are such that there is substantial authoritative support
for the practices followed by the registrant and the position of the Commission has not
previously been expressed in rules, regulations, or other official releases of the Commission,
including the published opinions of its chief accountant."
161. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1967), contains the uniform accounting rules for
the majority of the SEC's registration and report forms under the Securities Act of 1933,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and
the Investment Company Act of 1940.
162. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(b)(1) (1967).
163. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(c) (1967).
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Moreover, any exceptions the accountant makes in connection with the
certificate shall be clearly identified, specifically and clearly stated, "and,
to the extent practicable, the effect of each such exception on the related
financial statements given."'64
Although certifications vary in form and language, the following is
typical:
We have examined the balance sheet of XYZ Corp. as at . . .
and the related statement of income and retained earnings for the
year then ended. Our examination was made in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards, and accordingly included such
tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures
as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and statement of
income and retained earnings present fairly the financial position of
XYZ Corp. at . . . and the results of its operations for the year
then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples'65 applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.
Generally accepted accounting principles are those which have sub-
stantial authoritative support. The determination of whether accounting
principles are "generally accepted" requires the exercise of judgment on
the part of the public accountant, as well as knowledge as to what prin-
ciples have found general acceptance, though some have received only
limited usage. The sources for determining whether an accounting prac-
tice has substantial authoritative support have been summarized as fol-
lows:
1. In the practices commonly found in business. This does not follow from the mere
fact that a practice exists, but from the fact that experience of the business has
demonstrated that the practice produces dependable results for the guidance of
management and for the information of investors and others.
2. The requirements and views of stock exchanges as leaders in the financial com-
munity; similarly the views and opinions of commercial and investment bankers
would be entitled to weight.
3. The regulatory commissions' uniform systems of accounts and accounting rulings
exercise a dominant influence on the accounting practices of the industries subject to
their jurisdiction. The commissions sometimes depart from generally accepted ac-
164. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(d) (1967).
165. The significance of the concept of "generally accepted accounting principles" stems
from the AICPA's requirement that the auditor's report "shall state whether the financial
statements are presented in accordance with general accepted principles of accounting."
Committee on Auditing Procedure, AICPA, Auditing Standards and Procedures 40 (State-
ment on Auditing procedure No. 33, 1963). Moreover, AICPA, Code of Professional Ethies
§ 2.02(e) defines as an act discreditable to the profession the failure to direct attention to a
material departure from "generally accepted accounting principles." See also SEC Accounting
Ser. Release No. 4, April 25, 1938, 11 Fed. Reg. 10913.
1967]
FORDIIAM LAW REVIEW
counting principles and, in such cases, it may be necessary for the certified public
accountant to make appropriate qualifications in his report.
4. The regulations and accounting opinions of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission have the controlling authority over reports filed with the Commission. The
Commission and its chief accountants have demonstrated a high degree of objectivity,
restraint and expertness in dealing with accounting matters. The regulations and
opinions issued to date are entitled to acceptance by their merit as well as on the basis
of the statutory authority of the Commission.
5. The affirmative opinions of practicing and academic certified public accountants
constitute authoritative support for accounting principles or practices. These may be
found in oral or written opinions, expert testimony, textbooks and articles.
6. Published opinions by committees of the American Accounting Association and of
the American Institute of CPAs. 166
As a result of this, acceptable alternative accounting principles have often
developed in the treatment of identical subject matter.
In his Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for
Business Enterprises, Paul Grady" 7 lists over twenty-five sets of such
alternative methods, 16 8 some of which are "truly 'either-or' choices of
management while others are applicable or not applicable depending on
the circumstances."' 69 However, the application of different accounting
principles in the treatment of the same transaction can cause significant
variance in reporting. For example:
Late in 1962 the tiny Albemarle Paper Mfg. Co. had put together a fancy financial
deal to acquire far-larger Ethyl from its two joint owners, General Motors and Stan-
dard Oil of New Jersey. The deal was virtually the same for both giant sellers: Each
owned 50% of Ethyl's shares, each had held them for 38 years, each would net
about $40 million on the sale. But when Jersey and GM stockholders opened their
annual reports a few months later, the deal could not have looked more different.
GM recorded the proceeds as income for the year, even before a penny of operat-
ing expenses was deducted. All the way down its income statement, to the net earn-
ings figure at the bottom, the subtotals were inflated. Jersey went to the other ex-
treme. It never showed the Ethyl profit on its earnings statement at all, not even
under "nonrecurring income" below the net income figure. Instead, it buried its profit
on Ethyl back in the "statement of stockholders' equity," a section of an annual
report few people bother to read.
The contrast was spectacular. Here were the two largest industrial corporations
in the world, with over 2 million stockholders and most of the financial community
looking on. Yet each came up with a radically different treatment of earnings from
the identical transaction. What's more, the treatments had been duly certified by
two of the nation's most respected accounting firms, Haskins & Sells for GM and
Price Waterhouse for Jersey.' 70
166. P. Grady, Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for Business
Enterprises 52-53 (AICPA Accounting Research Study No. 7, 1965).
167. A retired partner of Price Waterhouse & Co., and former Director of Accounting
Research of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
168. P. Grady, supra note 166, at 373-79.
169. Id. at 373.
170. Forbes, May 15, 1967, 28 at 34. But see APB, AICPA, Reporting the Results of
Operations (Opinion No. 9, 1966).
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Similarly, a leading financial publication recently compared two profit
statements of the same company for the same period. Although it pur-
portedly used generally accepted accounting principles for both, it applied
more conservative accounting principles in the one than the other. The
operations of the same company, thus reported under such differing gen-
erally accepted accounting principles, revealed:
GOLDEN FLEECE MA]
CONSOLIDATED INC
Net Sales
Cost of Goods Sold
Gross Profit
Other Operating Income
Selling, General &
Administrative Expenses
Other Income (Expenses):
Interest Expense
Net Income-Subsidiaries
Amortization of Goodwill
Miscellaneous
Net Income Before Taxes
State Income Taxes
Federal Income Taxes-Deferred
Federal Income Taxes--Current
Charges Equivalent to Tax Reductions from:
Investment Tax Credits
Tax Loss Carryovers
Net Income
Earnings Per Share
Source: Practising Law Institute, Decembe
counting Problems.171
NUFACTURING CO.
ME STATEIENT
Method A
(Conservative)
$240,809,200
201,287,300
39,521,900
39,521,900
24,210,700
15,311,200
(1,810,900)
538,900[sic]
(170,000)
(269,000)
(1,711,900)
13,599,300
638,000
5,238,000
775,000
990,000
7,641,000
5,958,300
$1.99
sr, 1966, Conference
Method B
(Liberal)
$243,924,600
199,248,200
44,676,400
1,191,000
45,867,400
26,46S,300
19,399,100
(1,873,400)
(229,200)
(2,102,600)
17,296,500
812,900
348,900
6,440,000
297,000
7,898,800
9,397,700
,3.14
on Corporate Ac-
The SEC itself is not totally blameless on this issue of varying account-
ing principles. In connection with the 7% Investment Credit, 7 2 the SEC
permits'73 the resultant tax saving either to be reflected currently in the
year the credit arises, or to be amortized over the productive life of the
171. Forbes, supra note 170, at 28-29.
172. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 38, 46-48.
173. SEC Accounting Ser. Release No. 96, Jan. 10, 1963, 28 Fed. Reg. 56.
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underlying asset.1 14 Moreover, the rate-making policies of other adminis-
trative agencies have added to the confusion.
75
174. See Metz, Accounting Profession Vexed by Lawsuits, Weighs Responsibility to
Shareholders, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1966, § 3, at 14, col. 4. "When Congress passed the 7
per cent credit for investment in business equipment, this accounting problem arose: Should
the 7 per cent credit that permitted businessmen to reduce their taxes by up to 7 per cent
of the cost of equipment be reflected in earnings in the year in question?
The Accounting Principles Board decided that it should not be so reflected, but that it
should be charged off a bit at a time over the life of the equipment-a conservative approach.
The S.E.C., reportedly spurred by the Administration, ruled that for its purposes either
method would be considered satisfactory. The Administration was anxious to have the
credit spur investment in plant and equipment, and the higher earnings that resulted from
an immediate reflection in earnings was designed to build business confidence.
Thus, despite the best efforts of the Accounting Principles Board, two methods were
permitted and the difficulty of comparing two corporations in the same industry became that
much harder when each used different methods." Id. See also APB, AICPA, Accounting for
the "Investment Credit" (Opinion No. 2, 1962), as amended by APB Opinion No. 4 (1964).
But see Proposed APB Opinion: Accounting for Income Taxes (Sept. 14, 1967) which,
in concluding that hereafter such credit should only be amortized, states: "The Board
recognizes that each of the differing viewpoints expressed concerning the manner in
which the investment credit should be accounted for possesses merit. However, it has con-
cluded that the circumstances surrounding the investment credit do not justify alternative
treatments. It also is aware that at present many, perhaps a majority of, companies account
for the credit on a flow-through basis. However, the flow-through method, because it reflects
the entire effect of the credit in the year in which it is obtained, can result in substantial
fluctuations in net income unrelated to current revenue-producing activities. The recent
statutory increase in the amount of allowable credit may result in a significant increase in
the magnitude of these fluctuations." Id. at 12. As of the time this article went to press,
the APB had not taken final action on this proposed opinion.
175. Not all the accounting rules promulgated by the various administrative agencies
necessarily conform to "generally accepted accounting principles." For example, in reporting
its income to its stockholders, the Union Pacific Railroad Company ("U.P.") substracts from
the income which it reports to the ICC (under the latter's accounting rules) a very substan-
tial sum ($20,700,000.00 in calendar year 1966) for deferred taxes it anticipates it will pay in
future years because of the accelerated depreciation it currently claims for income tax
purposes. U.P. thus feels that this reduction-which lowered its 1966 earnings from $4.76 per
share to $3.84 per share-was "necessary to conform accounting for current Federal income
taxes to generally accepted accounting principles." Union Pacific R.R., Seventeenth Annual
Report 30 (1966). See APB, AICPA, New Depreciation Guidelines and Rules (Opinion No. 1,
1962), and APB, AICPA, Status of Accounting Research Bulletins (Opinion No. 6, at 43,
1965). Paragraph 20 of APB Opinion No. 6 amends Accounting Research Bulletin ("ARB")
No. 44 (dealing with Declining Balance Depreciation), as follows: "ARB 44 (Revised)-De-
dining-balance Depreciation 20. Pending further study, paragraph 9 is revised to read as
follows:
9. When a company subject to rate-making processes adopts the declining-balance method
of depreciation for income tax purposes but adopts other appropriate methods for financial
accounting purposes in the circumstances described in paragraph 8, and does not give
accounting recognition to deferred income taxes, disclosure should be made of this fact."
However, this amendment to ARB No. 44 was dissented to by one-third of the members
of the APB: "The intent of paragraph 20 of this Opinion is to continue the requirement for
ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY
In today's markets, reported earnings often become the common denom-
inator of the price of securities. Although numerous companies use con-
servative accounting principles, many managements, conscious of perfor-
mance, will often turn to more liberal accounting principles to bolster
their financial performance." 6 It has thus been stated:
Under the present accounting rules, there is a very fine line between "maximizing"
and plain, old-fashioned manipulation. Take the well publicized Westec scandal that
broke last summer. When the facts were known, it was quite clear that Westec Corp.'s
acquisition-minded management had been pushing the flexible accounting principles
to the breaking point in order to keep earnings and the price of its stock as high as
possible. Westec took directly into income nonrecurring profits on sales of oil prop-
erties; it treated oil production payments sold to an insurance company as current
income rather than deferring them until oil was actually produced; it included in its
earnings for a given year the profits of companies not acquired until the following
year. Just nine months after reporting 1965 earnings of $4.9 million and assets of
$56 million, Westec was in bankruptcy, its stock down 33% before trading was
suspended.' 77
C. Efforts Toward More Uniform Reporting
Arguments for and against greater uniformity in reporting have been
summed up as follows:
Critics of the existence of acceptable alternative principles of accounting have
asserted that the financial results of operations of companies in the same industries
are frequently not susceptible of meaningful, and indeed produce misleading, com-
parisons by the great body of public investors. They further argue that, while dis-
closure and consistency are desirable for reporting purposes, they are not a satisfac-
tory substitute for more uniform accounting principles. Defenders of acceptable
alternatives do not agree that there is such a diversity of accounting principles as to
vitiate comparisons between one company and another, and assert that advances in
the development and improvement of accounting principles "will come about not by
disclosure of the accounting practice followed but to omit the previous requirement for
disclosure of the effect of the practice. Thus, in their opinion, the Accounting Principles Board
is inappropriately sponsoring the viewpoint that investors and other users of financial state-
ments should be told of the practice but need not be furnished the information to judge its
significance." Id. at 43-44. See also Proposed APB Opinion: Accounting for Income
Taxes (Sept. 14, 1967) which discusses inter alia, the treatment of actual tax savings
through the use of accelerated depredation, and concludes that the full amount of
income taxes should be deducted from income in the period that the income is reported,
regardless of when the tax is actually paid.
176. See Forbes, supra note 170, at 39, 42.
177. Forbes, supra note 170, at 30-31. Civil actions have been brought against Westec's
accountants and others for violations of the antifraud and antimanipulative provisions of the
federal securities laws. Ten of such actions, originally brought in the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of New York, have been transferred to the Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division, the situs of (i) other similar or related proceedings, (ii) Westec's
principal place of business, and (iii) Westec's Chapter X Reorganization proceeding. Schneider
v. Sears, 265 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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building a Procrustean bed but by refinement of existing practices and seeking bettel
ones."
178
Concerned, however, over the unnecessary variances in the presentation
of financial reports (particularly in unregulated industries'"9 ), the Ac-
counting Principles Boardi s° ("APB") of The American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") has endeavored to narrow the
areas of difference and inconsistency in practice. Several years ago, the
Council of the AICPA, in an attempt to put some teeth18 ' in the APB's
proclamations, issued a special bulletin'8 2 applicable to financial state-
178. Pines, supra note 157, at 748.
179. As to uniformity in regulated industries, see Price, Walker & Spacek, Accounting
Uniformity in the Regulated Industries, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 824 (1965).
180. See Sprouse & Vagts, The Accounting Principles Board and Differences and
Inconsistencies in Accounting Practice: An Interim Appraisal, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 706,
707-08 (1965): "Prior to 1959 there existed a Committee on Accounting Procedure, created
in 1938 by the American Institute of Accountants (as the AICPA was then called) to deal
with accounting matters. Before that there had been some significant discussions and cor-
respondence with the New York Stock Exchange, and in 1934 six accounting rules were
adopted directly by vote of the membership, but there was no continuing systematic procedure
for the establishment of accounting principles. During the twenty years of its existence, the
Committee on Accounting Procedure published fifty-one Accounting Research Bulletins as
part of a program of research and publication of recommendations about the use of certain
accounting procedures. The Bulletins tended to present ad hoc solutions to unrelated specific
problems and frequently recognized the acceptability of two or more procedures for account-
ing for identical transactions occurring under identical circumstances. Furthermore, the
Bulletins presented recommendations only; with the exception of the six rules adopted by
the AICPA membership vote, the conclusions contained in the Bulletins were not binding
on the Institute membership. Accordingly, procedures not embraced in the Bulletins might
also be considered to be 'generally accepted.' Dissatisfaction with this approach led to a
report of the Special Committee on Research Program to the Council of the AICPA which
was approved in April 1959. With this approval was established the Accounting Principles
Board (APB), composed at first of eighteen, and then of twenty-one, members. These are
largely accountants in active practice. Characteristically, each of the 'big eight' accounting
firms is represented; the rest of the seats are distributed among representatives of smaller
firms plus a few members from business firms, the academic community and government.
The Board promptly adopted 'Charter Rules' to detail its procedure and objectives."
The "Big Eight" public accounting firms are: Arthur Andersen & Co.; Ernst & Ernst;
Haskins & Sells; Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; Price
Waterhouse & Co.; Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart; and Arthur Young & Co. While the "Big
Eight" public accounting firms employ about 15% of all CPAs, it is estimated that-as of
recently-they did approximately 80% of SEC certifications. With the 1964 amendments to
the 1934 Act extending its reporting requirements to smaller companies, however, it is an-
ticipated that much of this new work will go to smaller accounting firms.
181. While the opinions of the AICPA and its boards and committees are most per-
suasive as to whether a principle is generally accepted, AICPA sanctions for breaches thereof
can generally extend only to its members; and, as to them, even expulsion does not necessarily
revoke their CPA status.
182. AICPA, Disclosure of Departures from Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board
(Special Bull., 1964).
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ments for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 1966, requiring
the following disclosure:
If an accounting principle that differs materially in its effect from one accepted in
an Opinion of the Accounting Principles Board is applied in financial statements, the
reporting member must decide whether the principle has substantial authoritative sup-
port and is applicable in the circumstances.
If he concludes that it does not, he would either qualify his opinion, disclaim an
opinion, or give an adverse opinion as appropriate.
If he concludes that it does have substantial authoritative support: (I) he would
give an unqualified opinion and (2) disclose the fact of departure from the Opinion
in a separate paragraph in his report or see that it is disclosed in a footnote to the
financial statements and, where practicable, its effect on the financial statements. 18
Investor confusion has also greatly concerned the SEC. Commission
Chairman Manuel F. Cohen, in addressing the 79th annual meeting
of the AICPA, cautioned:
I believe the highest priority should be given to the elimination of unsound prac-
tices and unjustified variances in financial reporting. We are aware that your Account-
ing Principles Board expects to publish its Opinion on pensions shortly and is pressing
hard to complete studies on important subjects including interperiod allocation of
corporate income taxes, accounting for research and development, intercorporate in-
vestments, and sundry other matters. But when a rapidiy expanding new business
changes from one "acceptable" and "conservative" method of accounting for develop-
ment expenses and depreciation to another such method and the result is a small
profit rather than a substantial loss, it is obvious that a good deal of work remains to
be done before "generally accepted accounting principles" command the degree of
public confidence we would all like them to have.184
In a similar vein, J. Arnold Pines, Associate Director of the Division of
Corporate Regulation of the SEC, has written:
While the accounting profession should be supported in its efforts to promote
uniformity in accounting principles, it seems fair to ask whether too much reliance
is being placed by corporate managements, by the accounting profession at large, by
the investing public-and by the Commission itself-on the professional accounting
organizations. While such reliance has been the Commission's policy for at least
twenty years, the efficacy of that policy, like that of any other long-standing policy,
deserves periodic re-examination and reassessment. It would seem that now would
be a most appropriate time for such a new appraisal.' 8 5
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION
It is somewhat puzzling that many public accountants-faced on the
one hand with clients who often wish to "maximize" results, and on the
other with the responsibility of determining whether a proffered principle
183. Sprouse & Vagts, The Accounting Principles Board and Differences and Incon-
sistencies in Accounting Practice: An Interim Appraisal, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 706, 709
(1965).
184. Cohen, supra note 158, at 58.
185. Pines, supra note 157, at 751.
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is widely accepted, or a statement is misleading' 8 -- are leading the fight
against greater uniformity in SEC financial reporting. Opponents of uni-
formity argue:
"There can never be one set of inflexible rules in the name of uniformity," contends
John W. Queenan, managing partner of Haskins & Sells. "Companies that appear on
the surface to be the same may actually operate much differently. One company may
use the newest equipment; its competitor may get by with heavy maintenance of old
equipment. It should be the job of accounting to reflect these differences in operating
conditions."
An oft-cited example to back up the argument for flexibility is that of the company
which elects not to include the results of a money-losing subsidiary in its reported
earnings. Management is pouring money into the subsidiary, which promises even-
tually to be highly profitable. But the accountants argue that if management were
forced to include it in current earnings, showing a heavy investment with no return,
it might decide to forego a very beneficial enterprise.' 8 7
However, in presenting highly technical variations, it is of no use to the
average investor that, through footnotes or elsewhere on the statement,
perfunctory disclosure is made of the type of principle used. Indeed:
Here is where Arthur Andersen's Spacek takes his fellow accountants to task. "My
brethren say, just tell the investors what the facts are and let them be on their
guard," he says. "I say 'booby trap.' We cannot just present statements to investors
and say, 'You ought to be able to find the booby traps.' "188
The trained analyst and the sophisticated investor are capable of com-
paring and determining true value, whether there is uniformity or not.
Given all the facts, they can make the proper adjustments among varying
principles and arrive at an objective conclusion. Certainly, as to such
persons, the client is not as unduly strapped as one would be led to believe.
Accordingly, uniformity should not generally affect a client seeking pri-
vate financing from a group of banks or insurance companies. Similarly,
no banker, in considering a mortgage on a $10,000,000 unencumbered,
prime piece of real estate, will refuse a substantial commitment solely
because the asset was properly carried on the corporation's balance sheet
for only $1,000,000.
In fact, it has been observed that:
Professional investors, the men who manage large portfolios of stocks, regard pub-
lished earnings with the utmost skepticism. One Wall Streeter who specializes in
arranging mergers and acquisitions says: "The only reason we look at a company's
competition is to get an idea of what phase a company is in vis-A-vis its industry and
subjectively analyze its management."
What he is saying is that officially reported earnings and assets, no matter how
illustriously certified, do not play a major role in his decision-making. And yet most
186. See, e.g., Teich v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 749, 263 N.Y.S.2d 932
(1st Dep't 1965) (mem.), which involved both of these problems.
187. Forbes, supra note 170, at 29.
188. Id. at 34.
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investors must depend on information this sophisticated investor regards as almost
useless.' 8 9
Thus, it is on the investing public-a rapidly growing group already
numbering over twenty million'°--that enforced uniformity would have
its main effect. It is to uniformity that regulatory agencies look to aid
them in administering the problems of their respective jurisdictions. By
no means is uniformity a panacea; but, why not give the public investor
-who on the average is far less astute to adjust variables-the same
assistance granted these agencies? If maximum flexibility was important
in SEC financials, abuses have undercut its usefulness by breeding situa-
tions such as in Westec.
Regardless of the pros and cons of greater uniformity, however, the
APB of the AICPA is making commendable steps in that direction. More-
over, the SEC, under its broad supervisory powers, seemingly has the
authority to bring about more uniform accounting rules by merely expand-
ing its Regulation S-X.' 9 ' If the SEC, impatient with the accountants'
housecleaning, did undertake such expansion, it would leave the pro-
fession saddled with increased uniformity, but still bedded down with
much of the uncertainty of whether their certified financials contained
misrepresentations or were otherwise misleading. Nor is this uncertainty
eliminated merely because a statement is prepared according to generally
accepted accounting principles, for their use does not necessarily im-
munize it from being misleading to the average investor.11
2
There are those who feel that the accountant can find ample protection
in liability insurance. On the other hand, as has been reliably observed:
It will be said that accountants' liability insurance can take care of the problem.
But this is an illusion. The cost of such insurance is based on experience. This in-
cludes the costs-which can be huge--of successful defense against unjust claims.
The more lawsuits there are against accountants, even if most of them fail, the higher
the premiums. The cost must be met from auditors' fees, and therefore is indirectly
a levy on the business community. At some point, if present trends continue, this
cost may become prohibitive.' 93
189. Id. at 44.
190. Close-Up of Today's Stock Market, U.S. News and World Report, July 3,
1967, at 62.
191. See 48 Stat. 85 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1964).
192. See Bradley, Auditor's Liability and the Need for Increased Accounting Uniformity,
30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 898, 909-14 (1965).
193. Editorial, The Specter of Auditors' Liability, J. Accountancy, Sept. 1965, at 33, 34.
In recently commenting on the 2.1 million dollar settlement offer by Lybrand, Ross Bros. &
Montgomery to dispose of the civil action instituted against it (and others) by the trustee of
Continental Vending Machine Co., principally based upon fraud and the preparation of
false and misleading statements, it was reported: "A spokesman for Lybrand-Ross said the
settlement offer was made to 'terminate the incredible drain on time of (the firm's) top
partners in the legal proceedings which have now gone on for two years, with no end in
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Although coverage is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain,194 indi-
vidual coverage has approximated as high as $15,000,000.1" The ade-
quacy of even such a figure, however, is questionable in an era demanding
greater disclosure" 6 and possible expansion of SEC protection.'97 Con-
sider the potential liability in a public offering of ten million shares at
$50 per share, if an inadvertent material omission rendered the financials
in the registration statement misleading and the price of the shares
dropped $20 each shortly after the issue was sold out.
It appears that in the interest of the public investor; greater reporting
uniformity seems inevitable. It seems advisable, therefore, that instead of
bickering within itself, the accounting profession as a whole should strive
toward achieving reporting principles which would not only be more
meaningful to the average investor, but would also help to narrow the
incidents of accountants' liability. One solution would be to integrate
all the accountants' obligations and liabilities provisions-at least those
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts-into one composite chapter. Such integration
should be with a view toward satisfying two important needs: (i) to
furnish the average investor with more accurate, objective and comparable
data, and (ii) to outline more clearly the limits of the auditor's liability
under the federal securities laws.
No amount of study or discussion will result in complete agreement-
even among its staunchest proponents-on the contents of such a chapter.
However, such a chapter could consist of two principal components, one
advising the accountant as to what is expected of him ("duties and guide-
lines section") and the other outlining the scope of civil liabilities for the
breach of such duties ("liabilities section").
The following suggestions are offered as illustrative of the features to
be considered in drafting the chapter's duties and guidelines section:
a) The establishment of more uniform accounting principles that
will be considered proper for SEC purposes, with a provision that any
sight' ... [and] to end the 'very substantial legal expenses.'" Wall Street Journal, Oct. 6,
1967, at 18, col. 3. See also the decision of the Council of the AICPA concerning "a proposed
effort to amend the Securities Act of 1933 to provide some limitation on the virtually
unlimited liability presently imposed on independent accountants under the statute." The
CPA, Oct, 1967, at 1.
194. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, at 13, col. 4.
195. See Bradley, Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Audit, 1966 J. Bus. L. 190, 195.
196. E.g., the SEC's controversial intention to put an end to "conglomerate" financial
reporting, which is the practice of lumping the revenues and earnings of a diversified
company into a single set of figures, leaving the investor in the dark as to the individual
operation of each division. See also Statement of the APB: Disclosure of Supplemental
Financial Information by Diversified Companies (Sept. 1967).
197. Suggestions have been made to extend the securities laws to inure to the benefit of
creditors, in addition to investors in securities.
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departure therefrom must be conspicuously noted and the effects
thereof explained.'98
b) An outline of the accountant's responsibilities in connection
with information acquired after certification. 199
c) Specification of the accountant's duties, if any, in connection
with interim reports which he need not certify, but which he may
know or suspect are faulty.
2-
d) An attempt, by examples if necessary, to define more clearly the
term "material," since this elusive term presently plays a vital role
(and should continue to do so) in determining liability under the
1933 and 1934 Acts. Although the aggregate of such examples would
not be all-inclusive, this approach has been successfully employed
elsewhere where terms were cumbersome to define,201  and might
assist the accountant in determining what to include or omit in the
financials he certifies.0 2
198. The ultimate definition, amendment, deletion, or supplementation of such prin-
ciples might well be left to a joint panel, established by the chapter, consisting of SEC
personnel and representatives of the accounting profession and business. Moreover, although
some industries are under the direct regulation of federal agencies other than the SEC, this
panel should have exclusive jurisdiction regarding the establishment of accounting rules under
which all companies report to their investors. See also APB Opinion No. 4 (1964) (dissent-
ing opinion). "Mr. Spacek dissents from the conclusion in paragraph 10. He believes this
Opinion illustrates the accounting profession's complete failure in its responsibility to establish
accounting principles that will provide reliable financial statements that are comparable
among companies and industries, for use of the public in making personal investment decisions.
He states there is no justification for sanctioning two contradictory practices to accommodate
SEC and other regulatory bodies and some CPAs who have approved reporting the investment
credit as, in effect, profit from acquisition rather than from use of property. This flouts
Congress's clear intent in granting the investment credit, 'to reduce the net cost of acquiring
depreciable property.' Alternative procedures under this Opinion can increase by up to 2S
per cent the earnings otherwise reported. In this Opinion and in SEC's stated position, Mr.
Spacek finds no word of concern for the investor, to whose protection both CPAs and SEC
supposedly are dedicated. He believes this Opinion approves accounting of the type that
precipitated the 1929 financial crisis, and that history is being repeated by actions of the
very authorities created to prevent such catastrophes. He feels this breakdown in safeguards
created to protect investors has resulted from fragmentation of responsibility for establishing
accounting principles, and the only remedy is to create a Federally established Court of
Accounting Principles with a prescribed basis for its decisions; this court would be inde-
pendent of the profession and regulatory commissions, and its decisions would be binding
on all, thus rescuing investors from their present abandonment." Id. at 24-25. See also notes
172-174 supra, and accompanying text.
199. See Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.DMN.Y. 1967), pp. 206-0S, 216, 218-19
supra.
200. See pp. 216, 218-19, supra; Taylor, The Published Interim Report and the CPA, J.
Accountancy, Sept. 1965, at 55.
201. See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a), which defines the term "gross income."
202. See APB, AICPA, Accounting for the Cost of Pension Plans (Opinion No. 8, 1 46,
1967]
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
Although consideration might also be given to the establishment of audit-
ing procedures required in the certification of SEC financials, it is perhaps
more desirable that auditing standards should be left flexible and up to
the profession.
Under the liabilities section of the chapter, the following should be
considered:
1) The creation of one all-inclusive rule governing accountants'
liability, clearly defined in scope and content, and broad enough to
replace the substantive variations existing between section 11 of the
1933 Act, and sections 10(b) and 18 of the 1934 Act.
2) Provision for the posting of security in a manner similar to that
of section 11 of the 1933 Act, in order to discourage nuisance suits.
3) Establishment of one statute of limitations, broad and flexible
enough to accommodate varying circumstances.
4) While retaining broad venue and process provisions, granting
jurisdiction over such causes of action solely to the federal courts, as
does section 27 of the 1934 Act.
5) Creation of a defense which-insofar as SEC financials are
concerned-absolves the accountant from liability in any forum, to
the extent that he follows the procedures outlined in or established
under the duties and guidelines section of the chapter.20 3
6) The establishment of a pre-clearance board to which the ac-
countant can look for guidance and immunity in the event a unique
situation arises, not then covered by the chapter's provisions and
regulations promulgated thereunder.0 4
No pretense is made that the above topics are all-inclusive, or that each
individually holds the key to achieving the dual purpose of aiding the
investor before he is hurt (for the right to sue does not always assure
adequate relief), and tightening the sphere of the auditor's liability. It is
submitted, however, that the principle behind such a chapter would
achieve both of these ends. Moreover, if the auditor's guidelines are more
clearly defined, practical insurance coverage should be more readily avail-
able to meet the anticipated expanding disclosure requirements of the
future.
1966), which deals with the importance of certain disclosures concerning pension plans; see
also Phoenix and Bosse, Accounting for the Cost of Pension Plans-APB Opinion No. 8, J.
Accountancy, Aug. 1967, at 27.
203. Although the establishment of some sort of fixed or variable over-all monetary
ceiling on the accountants' SEC liability might also be desirable to the accounting profession,
such special treatment would only precipitate demands by other experts seeking similar
curbs on their own liabilities, thus deleting necessary investor protection.
204. Such a board might consist of the same personnel as the panel mentioned in note
198, supra.
